31 Aug 1995 GMDSS PROBLEMS - HOW SERIOUS ARE THEY? During the early morning hours of Monday June 5th, 1995, the watchstander at Coast Guard Communications Station (COMMSTA) Boston received two high frequency digital selective calling (DSC) distress alerts, each having a different distressed vessel identity, but indicating identical distress locations (11.11S, 111.11W) and natures of distress (fire/explosion). Both alerts were relayed by different vessels. COMMSTA Boston unsuccessfully attempted to establish communications with the distressed vessels and referred the alerts to RCC New York. RCC New York shifted Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC) responsibilities to RCC Alameda, California, because of the reported distress location. RCCs Alameda and New York then worked together in an attempt to find and assist these apparently distressed vessels. RCC Alameda contacted Lloyds Casualty Department, and RCC New York accessed the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) TIES computer in Geneva, Switzerland, in an attempt to identify the ship based upon the maritime mobile service identity (MMSI) included in the alert. Results were negative. MMSIs include a Maritime Identification Digits (MID) country identifier, enabling RCCs to directly contact the administration under which the vessel operates. The first alert included a MID of 467, unlisted by both ITU and Lloyds. Although the second distressed vessel's identity included a valid MID, the number itself appeared invalid. In the course of tracking the MID, the SMC contacted the vessel which relayed one of the calls. The SMC awoke a testy master at 0400 local, who said his ship did NOT relay the DSC distress alert. He said he would check with his crew and, if the DSC was relayed by his ship, call the SMC back. The SMC did not hear back from him. Once the SMC ran out of numbers to check, relays to contact and RCC's to brief on their progress, they issued an urgent marine information broadcast over Inmarsat, then waited to see if any of their actions turned up anything. Nothing further was ever turned up. Alerts like this are not uncommon with both DSC and Inmarsat C. Some recurring GMDSS problems currently exasperating RCC watchstanders in the United States include: - Lack of two-way communications. Although both DSC and Inmarsat C were designed for two-way communications, ability to follow-up communications with those sending distress alerts over these devices is rare. Many operators seem to treat DSC and Inmarsat C equipment devices as if they were manually-activated EPIRBs! - Wrong position. Many distress alerts sent over DSC and Inmarsat C have incorrect position information. Most of the Inmarsat C alerts received and handled by RCCs New York and Alameda to date have had inaccurate positions. - Bad identity. Many DSC alerts have an invalid identity. - Lack of a comprehensive database of GMDSS identities. The deficiency of MMSI data has been a particular problem. A SAR watchstander receiving a preformatted distress alert message with an apparently invalid identity can never be sure it's invalid without a comprehensive database. - Inability to contact ships. Many ships do not respond to calls from RCCs over DSC or Inmarsat C. - False alerts from GMDSS equipment capable of sending preformatted distress alert messages to RCCs. False alerts have been extensively discussed in other GMDSS articles. Is better training a solution? Maybe, but probably not in the United States. First, whatever training requirements we levy would apply only to the relatively few US-flagged SOLAS and other inspected vessels. The U.S. has no radio operator training nor "hands on" testing requirements for inspected vessels, nor operator testing requirements for uninspected vessels. The U.S. Congress is even contemplating delicensing marine radios, including GMDSS radios, voluntarily carried on vessels operating domestically. If we cannot adequately train operators of GMDSS equipment on SOLAS-regulated vessels, how will we manage use of GMDSS equipment on millions of uninspected vessels, where no training, no operator testing, or in some cases, no licensing requirements exist? We are working with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Inmarsat Organization and, when possible, other maritime SAR organizations, to find implementable and lasting solutions for some of these problems. We believe they are solvable. Let's look at the problems described above. ++ Lack of two-way communications. Not all GMDSS equipment have this problem. For example, Inmarsat A ship earth stations have proven their worth to RCCs many times over. Whenever the vessel sending a satellite EPIRB, Inmarsat C or DSC distress alert can be identified and its Inmarsat A identity established, a quick call to the ship is usually all that's necessary to validate the distress. Also, ships identified through the Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system contacted over Inmarsat A have usually been more willing to divert to assist in a SAR case than one which simply received necessary information through a NAVTEX or SafetyNET broadcast. Assuming the availability of a clear satellite channel, the problem with Inmarsat A, B and M terminals is that not enough ships use them. We have found the AMVER ship reporting system, used in conjunction with GMDSS, to be an invaluable tool. Inmarsat A ship earth stations are used by ships personnel for all types of communications, and they are quite familiar with its operation. However, Inmarsat C and DSC equipment is generally only used for distress and safety messages, so persons are often unfamiliar with them. Although we may not always be able to convince mariners to use DSC and Inmarsat C for general communications, we should be able to convince manufacturers to make that equipment easier to operate. We plan to ask IMO to consider means, such as amended performance standards or recommendations to ITU, to ensure such GMDSS equipment automatically establishes two-way communications with the station which acknowledges the distress alert, without requiring special action by the operator. Perhaps this could be accomplished on DSC equipment by automatically tuning the radio to a designated safety working channel once an acknowledgment is received, and requesting the operator to communicate on that channel. Once a distress alert is transmitted, Inmarsat C ship earth stations could similarly activate a distress alarm to ship personnel and request the ship operator to type a message to the RCC. We also plan to ask that IMO include provisions for controls and software procedures so distress alerting can be simpler, consistent and error-free; standardize procedures for preparing preformatted distress alert messages; encourage entry of nature of distress in such messages where possible; and simplify RCC shore-ship communications with the distressed vessel. ++ Bad location. There's little excuse for an incorrect position to be transmitted with a distress call. To help overcome this problem, at least for SOLAS and other inspected vessels, we plan to ask IMO to consider requiring DSC and Inmarsat C equipment not having an integral navigation receiver to have a NMEA 0183 or IEC 1162 interface connector installed on the equipment, and to require that equipment be connected to a satellite navigation receiver on the vessel. If a navigation receiver is not installed, we plan to ask that the position be manually updated every four hours while the ship is underway. Inmarsat already transmits an indicator with an Inmarsat C distress alert if a position is more than 24 hours old. DSC has no such provision. ++ Bad identity. This is primarily a DSC, not an Inmarsat problem. Other than improving GMDSS identity databases, improving radio violations enforcement (assuming the vessel can be found), and preventing entry of identities by the operator, this problem could be increasingly difficult to solve. Delicensing users of this equipment may exacerbate the problem. When necessary, DSC distress calls can be relayed by the following three methods: - Manual. A ship radio operator receiving a DSC distress alert that has not been acknowledged by an RCC, sets up a call to an RCC using DSC or Inmarsat. Once a call is set up, the operator provides the RCC watchstander known information concerning the distress. All GMDSS DSC radios have this feature. - Semi-automatic. An operator receiving an unacknowledged distress alert on DSC, presses a button which transmits a DSC distress relay signal. The MMSI and position of the distressed vessel is automatically derived from the received distress alert, but can also be manually entered by the operator. All GMDSS DSC radios have this feature. - Automatic. A DSC radio receiving a distress alert, transmits a DSC distress relay signal if the alert has not been acknowledged within five minutes, or if a second alert from the distressed vessel is received. No action by a radio operator is necessary. Only certain GMDSS DSC radios have this feature. The "testy master" who had his sleep interrupted by a call from RCC Alameda may have had a DSC radio set on the "automatic" mode. If direct communications can be established with an operator who sent a DSC distress alert using an invalid identity, then that problem might be overcome. We have generally been unsuccessful communicating with a vessel whose distress alert had been relayed to us by semi-automatic or automatic means. We are considering asking IMO and ITU to eliminate both the semi-automatic and automatic distress alert relaying capabilities on future DSC equipment. ++ Lack of a comprehensive database of GMDSS identities. RCC watchstanders need access to all of the identities used in the GMDSS, including MMSIs; Inmarsat A 7-digit identities and 9-digit mobile earth station identities used by Inmarsat B, C and M; Inmarsat E and COSPAS-SARSAT EPIRB serial identities; and radio call signs. Although there is no one database containing all of these GMDSS identities, there's been excellent progress toward resolving this problem. Among the most useful to U.S. RCCs have been radio call signs, Inmarsat's mobile earth station identities, and COSPAS-SARSAT 406 MHz EPIRB serial identities. In the U.S., RCCs receive alert messages from serially-encoded 406 MHz EPIRBs which include the information required by IMO Resolution A.764(18), Establishment, Updating and Retrieval of the Information Contained in the Registration Databases of Satellite EPIRBs. RCCs can often take immediate action when receiving one of these registered EPIRB alert messages, without having to obtain additional information elsewhere. ITU has helped by providing RCCs electronic access by Internet to their MMSI and radio call sign computer files. In August, they made MMSI and MID information accessible by Internet file transfer protocol as well, allowing RCCs to obtain up-to-date listings before a distress occurs. We must convince those states assigning MMSIs to international shipping to register them at ITU immediately. Other database initiatives include ensuring that registries of serially-encoded EPIRBs be accessible by RCCs on a 24-hour basis, asking Inmarsat to allow RCC access to unregistered as well as registered Inmarsat identities, asking port state authorities to record unregistered MMSIs during boarding inspections, and sharing database information among RCCs worldwide. ++ Inability to contact ships. This problem can be partly alleviated by the solutions above, by replying with a distress priority call or with another system such as Inmarsat A, and encouraging operators to use these systems for purposes other than distress, such as transmitting no-charge meteorological and ship position reports. Information overload on NAVTEX and Inmarsat SafetyNET, and increased number of ship alarms added by GMDSS, also contribute to this problem. Recognizing that the U.S. is one of contributors to information overload, we are working to better manage these broadcasts. GMDSS problems need to be resolved quickly. If problems exist now with SOLAS-regulated vessels, those problems could become intolerable when one or two orders of magnitude more fishing, recreational and other non-SOLAS vessels begin using GMDSS-compatible equipment! We expect these problems ultimately will be resolved. Inmarsat and IMO's commitment and efforts toward improving the GMDSS remain crucial to its success. GMDSS as a whole, with its Inmarsat A, its satellite EPIRBs, and its NAVTEX and Inmarsat SafetyNET broadcasts, has already helped to save hundreds of lives and proven its worth to RCCs. For more information concerning GMDSS in the United States, see the Internet Web server http://www.navcen.uscg.mil/marcomms/marcomms.htm or Gopher server gopher.navcen.uscg.mil. The views expressed herein are those of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard.